COIN 101

Following is excerpted from a post by 1LT Alex Pruden in FOB Blessing on 7/23/10:


"Although my platoon is tasked with providing security in the Waygul Valley, combat and security operations actually make up a relatively small amount of what we do. A successful counterinsurgency campaign is like a tripod: it stands upon good security, governance, and development. So although the security is very important (and in many ways is prerequisite to the other two), governance and development are also deserving of our time and resources. Unfortunately, just as the insurgents we face are clever and resourceful enemies, so are there major obstacles which must be surmounted in the other areas of governance and development as well.

Ironically, one of the biggest obstacles in the development of the Afghan government and the development of the country has been us. Or rather, I should say that we were an important part of the reconstruction process in the beginning, our involvement is netting diminishing returns over time. The onus of responsibility for government and development (and security as well) really needs to fall on the Afghan government. Our assistance, financial and otherwise, in this valley has I think historically been a crutch that gets leaned on, rather than the kick in the ass that it needs to be. Fortunately, we are putting a lot of emphasis on GiROA led initiatives. Putting the onus on the Afghan government is the only long-term solution for all parties involved.

There's no easy way to go about it without breaking a few hearts, however. The village elders expect coalition forces to help them out with cement and other projects, the Afghan security forces expect us to take the lead on planning and executing missions while they tag along, and the government often tries to pin its problems on us. Changing perceptions and expectations is a difficult task, but I have no doubt that the work we are doing towards that goal will pay dividends for the U.S. long after we leave this valley."